Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMirakhor, Abbas-
dc.contributor.authorNg, Adam Boon Ka-
dc.contributor.authorDewandaru, Ginanjar-
dc.contributor.authorAbdul Hamid, Baharom-
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-26T07:00:35Z-
dc.date.available2017-05-26T07:00:35Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationMirakhor, Abbas, Ng, Adam Boon Ka, Dewandaru, Ginanjar & Abdul Hamid, Baharom. (2017). Is the regime of risk transfer sustainable? Impossible contract and inequality. Research in International Business and Finance, 41, pp. 16-19.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0275-5319-
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531917301769-
dc.identifier.urihttps://ikr.inceif.org/handle/INCEIF/2531-
dc.description.abstractIn a risk transfer and shifting financial systems, an interest rate based debt contract is an "impossible contract," since, under the axioms of conventional economics, the borrower has an incentive not to repay the loan. Such impossible contract is made possible by creating a virtual world of certainty through mechanisms such as collateral requirements and an edifice of legal, administrative, policy incentive mechanisms that include positive and negative enforcements that protect the creditor. The society has to bear huge costs to make them possible. Risk sharing has the potential to enhance efficiency as each party to contracts has "skin-in-the-game", thus eliminating or minimizing the principal-agent problem. Participants in a contract of an economic undertaking can choose higher risk-higher return projects thus increase the efficiency and productivity of the system. It can also create a reciprocal and trusting environment that strengthens social cohesion, promotes social mobility and reduces income inequality without perverse incentive effects.en_US
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rights2017. Elsevier-
dc.sourceSEDONA-
dc.subjectRisk transferen_US
dc.subjectContractsen_US
dc.subjectFinancial systemsen_US
dc.titleIs the regime of risk transfer sustainable? Impossible contract and inequalityen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
ikr.topic.maintopicIslamic financeen_US
ikr.topic.subtopicRisk sharing in Islamic financeen_US
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.04.001-
ikr.doctypeScholarly Works-
Appears in Collections:Journal Article


  • is_the_regime_of_risk_transfer_sustainable_abbas_adam_gin...
    • Size : 149,37 kB

    • Format : Adobe PDF

    • View : 
    • Download : 
  • Full metadata record
    DC FieldValueLanguage
    dc.contributor.authorMirakhor, Abbas-
    dc.contributor.authorNg, Adam Boon Ka-
    dc.contributor.authorDewandaru, Ginanjar-
    dc.contributor.authorAbdul Hamid, Baharom-
    dc.date.accessioned2017-05-26T07:00:35Z-
    dc.date.available2017-05-26T07:00:35Z-
    dc.date.issued2017-
    dc.identifier.citationMirakhor, Abbas, Ng, Adam Boon Ka, Dewandaru, Ginanjar & Abdul Hamid, Baharom. (2017). Is the regime of risk transfer sustainable? Impossible contract and inequality. Research in International Business and Finance, 41, pp. 16-19.en_US
    dc.identifier.issn0275-5319-
    dc.identifier.urihttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531917301769-
    dc.identifier.urihttps://ikr.inceif.org/handle/INCEIF/2531-
    dc.description.abstractIn a risk transfer and shifting financial systems, an interest rate based debt contract is an "impossible contract," since, under the axioms of conventional economics, the borrower has an incentive not to repay the loan. Such impossible contract is made possible by creating a virtual world of certainty through mechanisms such as collateral requirements and an edifice of legal, administrative, policy incentive mechanisms that include positive and negative enforcements that protect the creditor. The society has to bear huge costs to make them possible. Risk sharing has the potential to enhance efficiency as each party to contracts has "skin-in-the-game", thus eliminating or minimizing the principal-agent problem. Participants in a contract of an economic undertaking can choose higher risk-higher return projects thus increase the efficiency and productivity of the system. It can also create a reciprocal and trusting environment that strengthens social cohesion, promotes social mobility and reduces income inequality without perverse incentive effects.en_US
    dc.languageEnglish-
    dc.language.isoenen_US
    dc.publisherElsevieren_US
    dc.rights2017. Elsevier-
    dc.sourceSEDONA-
    dc.subjectRisk transferen_US
    dc.subjectContractsen_US
    dc.subjectFinancial systemsen_US
    dc.titleIs the regime of risk transfer sustainable? Impossible contract and inequalityen_US
    dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
    ikr.topic.maintopicIslamic financeen_US
    ikr.topic.subtopicRisk sharing in Islamic financeen_US
    dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.04.001-
    ikr.doctypeScholarly Works-
    Appears in Collections:Journal Article


  • is_the_regime_of_risk_transfer_sustainable_abbas_adam_gin...
    • Size : 149,37 kB

    • Format : Adobe PDF

    • View : 
    • Download :